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Stability and Shift in the Semantics of Socialism: An Overview 
fficial Semantic Continuity: From Marx to Mao to Chinese Modernity 
It is evident that from an official Chinese government perspective, capitalism is 
viewed as a phenomenon that will inevitably yield to global socialism. Yu (2008), 
a director and research fellow at the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, states 
the case in straightforward language:1 
                                                 
1 Yu, Pei (2008). The October Revolution and the historical destiny of scientific socialism: In 
commemoration of the 90th anniversary of the October Revolution, Social Sciences in China, Vol. 29, 
Issue 1, February 2008, pp. 29 – 49. [Yu is Director and Research Fellow of the Institute of World 
History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Vice President of the China Society of History, and 
Director of the Research Center of Historical Theory, CASS.]  
O
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Deng Xiaoping Theory comes down in one continuous line from Leninism and Mao 
Zedong Thought and is Marxism in practice with the characteristics of the times and 
national traits. The magnificent achievements in the development of contemporary 
Chinese society are the outcome of unwavering adherence to and development of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. In the context of economic globalization, we are 
still living in a transitional time from capitalism to socialism, an era started with the 
October Revolution. The 21st century will see the rejuvenation of socialism, for the 
replacement of capitalism by socialism is an inevitable trend of world history.  
The above language reflects the sustained belief and rhetoric of historical linearity espoused 
by the Communist Party of China Central Committee (CPCCC), which spans from the 
theory of Marx (1848), to its application framed by Lenin’s actions and writings and 
culminating in Russia’s October Revolution in 1917, to its national characterization in 
China by Mao Zedong (1949-1976), and accelerated economic development platform by 
Deng Xiaoping (1978). As importantly, it faithfully echoes Lenin’s belief (written in 
September 1917/published in April 1918) that the proletariat-socialist world revolution is 
well on its inevitable way to fruition and triumph over capitalism: 2  
The transition from capitalism to communism is certainly bound to yield a tremendous 
abundance and variety of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same: 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
It is important to note that the goal is global socialism not merely country-specific, a 
theoretical principle consistent with Marx, in his early (pre-1848) writings3 and his and 
Engels’ Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848).4 
Semantic Shifts in the Term Socialism  
The term socialism is insufficient to denote the specific type of political system that is 
predicted to triumph over capitalism; rather, the term must be accompanied and preceded by 
the qualifier scientific. This qualifier is necessary for two reasons: first, to differentiate 
scientific socialism from conservative (including humanistic and various other forms) 
socialism and, second, to acknowledge, adhere to, and refine through practice the 
                                                                                                                                               
 
2  Lenin, V. I. (1918). The state and revolution. Retrieved on April 27, 2009, at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/ 
3    Tucker, R. C. (1961/2000). Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (3rd edition). Edison, New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers. 
4  Panitch, L. (May-June 2009). Thoroughly modern Marx. Foreign Policy, pp. 140-145. See also 
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theoretical system advanced by Karl Marx and Frederich Engels in their Manifesto of the 
Communist Party (1848). Yu (2008) summarizes the nature and importance of this work: 5 
Marx and Engels comprehensively and systematically expounded the theory of 
scientific socialism in the Manifesto of the Communist Party and pointed out that the 
communist movement had already become an irresistible historical trend. The 
publication of the Manifesto marked the official inception of the theoretical system of 
scientific socialism. Its key idea is that in every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of 
production and exchange and the social organization necessarily following from it form 
the basis upon which the political and intellectual history of that epoch is built up. 
Proceeding from this fundamental tenet Marx and Engels expounded the historical law 
of the appearance, development and inevitable extinction of capitalism. (Italics added) 
It is equally important to note that the term socialism was insufficiently descriptive by 1848 
to convey the type of socialism espoused by Marx and Engels; thus, the term communism 
was selected by Marx and Engels, as it alone maintained the strict adherence to the abolition 
of private property. Engels, in the Preface to the 1888 English language edition of the 
Manifesto, wrote:6 
By Socialists, in 1847, were understood, on the one hand the adherents of the various 
Utopian systems: Owenites in England, Fourierists in France, both of them already 
reduced to the position of mere sects, and gradually dying out; on the other hand, the 
most multifarious social quacks who, by all manner of tinkering, professed to redress, 
without any danger to capital and profit, all sorts of social grievances, in both cases men 
outside the working-class movement, and looking rather to the "educated" classes for 
support. Whatever portion of the working class had become convinced of the 
insufficiency of mere political revolutions, and had proclaimed the necessity of total 
social change, called itself Communist....Thus, in 1847, socialism was a middle-class 
movement, communism a working-class movement. Socialism was, on the Continent at 
least, "respectable"; communism was the very opposite. And as our notion, from the 
very beginning, was that "the emancipation of the workers must be the act of the 
working class itself," there could be no doubt as to which of the two names we must 
take. Moreover, we have, ever since, been far from repudiating it.   
                                                 
5  Yu, P. (2008). Op. cit. 
6  Mark, K. and F. Engels (1848). Preface to the 1888 English Edition, The Manifesto of the 
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Semantic Shifts: 
 Capitalism to Imperialism & Influences on Socialist Thought  
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the term capitalism was deemed too 
narrow by economic analysts to denote the phenomenon of cross-border market extension 
associated with capitalism’s practice. In 1902, this perceived phenomenon characterized by 
the insatiable appetite and search for new markets beyond a producer’s political borders to 
sell its surplus production that could not be sold in-country was labeled imperialism in the 
eponymous work by John A. Hobson, an English historian and some time academic. 
Hobson viewed his study with a sense of urgency rooted in medical metaphors; the study 
was “distinctively one of social pathology, and no endeavor is made to disguise the 
malignity of the disease.”7 Imperialism was a direct outgrowth of perverted nationalism—
that is, nationalism that did not naturally lead to internationalism, or “brotherhood”:8 
Nationalism is a plain highway to internationalism, and if it manifests divergence 
we may well suspect a perversion of its nature and its purpose. Such a perversion is 
Imperialism, in which nations trespassing beyond the limits of facile assimilation 
transform the wholesome stimulative rivalry of varied national types into the cut-
throat struggle of competing empires.…[Furthermore,] its attack upon the liberties 
and the existence of weaker or lower races [sic] stimulates in them a corresponding 
excess of national self-consciousness.…We have welded Africanderdom9 into just 
                                                 
7  Hobson, J. A. (1902/2003). Imperialism: A Study. Library of Economics and Liberty. Retrieved 
on May 1, 2009, at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Hobson/hbsnImp0.html#Preface.  
8  Ibid., Introduction. 
9  The term Africanderdom, also spelled Afrikanderdom, here refers to the Jameson Raid, a failed 
uprising involving a British force entering into the Cape region against Afrikaners (generally, of 
Dutch origin) in the Transvaal area of what is now South Africa on the New Year’s week-end of 
December 29, 1985 – January 2, 1896. It led, famously, to jingoism and screeds on both sides, 
and which maligned imperialism and related its consequences to race hatred and thwarted 
nationalism:  
A new feeling has rushed in huge billows over South Africa. The flaccid and cowardly 
Imperialism, that had already begun to dilute and weaken our national blood, gradually 
turned aside before the new current which permeated our people. Many who, tired of the 
slow development of the national idea, had resigned themselves to Imperialism now 
paused and asked themselves what Imperialism had produced in South Africa? Bitterness 
and race hatred it is true! 
(Quoted in Lord Milner and South Africa, by Ernest Bruce Iwan-Müeller, published by W. 
Heinemann, 1902. Text quoted was originally published in 1896 in Ons Land, the “organ” of 
the Afrikander Pary. Digitized version retrieved on May 1, 2009, at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=JvxyAAAAMAAJ).  
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such a strong dangerous nationalism, and we have joined with other nations in 
creating a resentful nationalism hitherto unknown in China [e.g., Boxer Rebellion, 
Taiyuan Massacre]. 
Hobson’s (1902) analytical framework of imperialism provided an important link to Lenin’s 
pre-revolutionary work, Imperialism, The highest stage of capitalism (1916w/1917p), in the 
same way that John Stuart Mill’s work (1861), Representative Government, Chapter XVI: 
Of Nationality, as connected with Representative Government,10 provided an important link 
to Hobson’s operating definition of the term nation. Mill, in his Autobiography, published 
in 1873, the year of his death, recalls his continuous exposure and early adherence, 
beginning in 1829, to the tenets (although not the means) held by the St. Simonian 
Socialists, particularly respecting community, labor, and the “perfect equality of men and 
women:”11 
But the St. Simonians I continued to cultivate ... Their criticisms on the common 
doctrines of Liberalism seemed to me full of important truth; and it was partly by 
their writings that my eyes were opened to the very limited and temporary value of 
the old political economy, which assumes private property and inheritance as 
indefeasible facts, and freedom of production and exchange as the dernier mot of 
social improvement. The scheme gradually unfolded by the St. Simonians, under 
which the labour and capital of society would be managed for the general account 
of the community every individual being required to take a share of labour [sic] 
either as thinker, teacher, artist, or producer, all being classed according to their 
capacity, and remunerated according to their works, appeared to me a far superior 
description of Socialism to Owen's. Their aim seemed to me desirable and rational, 
however their means might be inefficacious; and though I neither believed in the 
practicability nor in the beneficial operation of their social machinery, I felt that the 
proclamation of such an ideal of human society could not but tend to give a 
beneficial direction to the efforts of others to bring society as at present constituted, 
nearer to some ideal standard. I honoured them most of all for what they have been 
most cried down for – the boldness and freedom from prejudice with which they 
treated the subject of family…on which scarcely any reformer has the courage to 
touch. In proclaiming the perfect equality of men and women, and an entirely new 
order of things in regard to their relations with one another, the St. Simonians, in 
common with Owen and Fourier, have entitled themselves to the grateful 
remembrance of future generations. 
                                                 
10  Mill, J. S. (1861) Representative Government. Retrieved on May 2, 2009, at 
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645r/chapter16.html. For a listing of the 
different schools of Socialism, see http://homepage.newschool.edu/het//schools/utopia.htm.   
11   Mill, J. S. (1873). Autobiography. Retrieved on May 3, 2009, at 
http://www.efm.bris.ac.uk/het/mill/auto.  
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From Thought to Action:  
Russia’s Revolution and the Praxis of Early Socialism  
The obvious socio-economic-power gap between the wealthy, the middle class, and the 
poor, its attendant political structures and consequences, and alternatives posited to remedy 
it were clearly a passionate issue of socio-intellectual concern, in constant publication and 
public dialogue and debate, from the time of Jean Jacques Rousseau’s foundational notions 
of collectivism12 in his work, Social Contract (1762). This particular work posited other 
important political notions such as the “abolition of the state/civil society[;]…a] distinction 
[that] fits with Marx’s ‘withering away’ of the state.”13   
In October 1917, the intellectual yielded to practice in the form of revolution in Russia, 
which established it as the first socialist state,14 and in short order, Lenin produced decrees 
that transferred all private land to the people and guaranteed equality and the right to self-
determination of the people. An important modification Lenin introduced to the dictatorship 
of the proletariat framework—together with that of shifting the possibility of socialism to 
pre-capitalist (in more recent terminology, underdeveloped) countries rather than only 
developed capitalist countries due to imperialism being labeled by Lenin as the highest 
form of capitalism—was the establishment of a central party to guide the State and educate 
the proletariat as professional (rather than amateur) revolutionaries: “I assert…that no 
movement can be durable without a stable organization of leaders…consist[ing] chiefly of 
persons engaged in revolutionary activities as a profession…to maintain continuity.”15 This 
principle was placed into action during the first days of the October Russian Socialist 
Revolution (October 1917) under the name of Council of People's Commissars, with Lenin 
as its first elected chairman.  
As the Chinese Communist Party continues to officially adhere to scientific socialism both 
locally and globally, it is to Chinese scientific socialism that we now turn for what it may 
mean for the wider geopolitics of the 21st century, particularly in Latin American and for 
the United States in that region. 
 
                                                 
12  Devine, James (June 2000). The Positive Political Economy of Individualism and Collectivism: 
 Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. POLITICS & SOCIETY, Vol. 28 No. 2, pp. 265-304. Sage      
Publications, Inc. Retrieved on May 3, 2009, at http://myweb.lmu.edu/jdevine/hlr/hlr.pdf.  
 
13  Ibid., p. 290. 
14  For information regarding the first successful workers’ revolution, see Paris Commune, March 
26 –May 30, 1871, at http://www.marxists.org/glossary/orgs/p/a.htm#paris-commune). 
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Section II 
“Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”: A Semantico-Political Overview 
Early Semantic Shifts in Chinese Socialism: The Mao Zedong Era  
Nearly four years after the Russian October Revolution, in June 1921, the Chinese 
Communist Party was formed, and Mao Zedong (1893-1976) was among its initial 
members. China had, by this time, directly experienced humiliating interactions with 
European and Asian imperialist powers that had resulted in policies and practices 
antithetical to China’s economic well-being, territorial sovereignty,16 and identity—perhaps 
made largely possible due to China itself concurrently experiencing dynastic deterioration 
and internal conflict.17 Beginning with The Opium War (1839-1842), primarily associated 
with England, and culminating approximately a century later, this period of the Ch’ing 
Dynasty involved territorial encroachment by, and political, commercial and civil 
extraterritoriality and subordination to British, French, German, Russian, the United States 
and Japanese governments and businesses. Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (as well 
as other, competing movements such as that of the Chinese Nationalist Party, founded in 
1912), therefore, were fully cognizant and experienced in the workings and consequences of 
imperialism within developing contexts and the devastating effects associated with 
imperialism to China’s governing institutions, economic prosperity, and positive self-image. 
This period was to be called in China the Century of Shame. Early on, Mao grasped the 
potential of the Chinese peasantry as revolutionaries and began to organize and train 
them—a critical and successful strategy supporting the ultimate triumph in 1949 of Chinese 
socialism over Chiang Kai-shek (1889-1975) and the National Movement he commanded.18 
Mao’s rise to national leadership spans a tumultuous and complex period from 1927 to 
1949, in which conflict with the Nationalist movement of Chiang Kai-shek was uppermost 
                                                 
16  “China celebrated the Chinese Youth Day Monday, also the 90th anniversary of an important 
cultural and political movement in modern Chinese history that fought imperialism and 
promoted democracy and science … The ‘May Fourth Movement’ started with mass student 
protests on May 4, 1919 against the government's response to the Treaty of Versailles that 
imposed unfair treaties on China and undermined the country's sovereignty.” Reported in 
China marks 90th anniversary of "May Fourth Movement" reviving patriotism, China View, 
www.chinaview.cn.  Retrieved on May 6, 2009, from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/04/content_11308861.htm.  
 
17 Tait, S. (2006). CHINA: A China Policy for This Century. Hoover Digest, Research and Opinion on 
Public Policy. Stanford University: Hoover Institution. Retrieved on May 5, 2009, from 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/2912081.html.  
 
18 Beeson, M. (2007). Regionalism & Globalization in East Asia: Politics, security & economic 
development. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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except during the putative truce reached so both factions could unite to fight Japan’s 
military encroachment into China.19 By 1949, Mao had become the chairman of the 
People’s Republic of China and Chiang Kai-shek—in Mao’s words, the “running dog” of 
“U.S. imperialism”20—and his followers had fled to Taiwan. Until 1945, Taiwan, also 
known, although not universally recognized, as the Republic of China, had been under 
Japanese control for fifty years.21  
Mao’s approach to development was based on adapting socialism to the Chinese context, 
which meant addressing its dominant agricultural base by collectives and, later, 
communes,22 and to supporting “national independence and liberation movements” 
globally.23 By 1955, in the analytic view of one recent analyst, China had “promoted itself 
as a leader of the developing world, a strategy Beijing is reasserting today.”24 It is widely 
acknowledged by Western analysts (and Asian-origin analysts publishing in Western 
academic venues) that Mao’s policies, which included the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) 
and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), failed to develop China’s productive capacity in 
agriculture or manufacturing.25  
                                                 
19  See, for example, Alexander, B. (2002). Chapter 7: Mao Zedong: The winning of China, in How 
great generals win: A military historian appraises the world’s greatest commanders, from 
Hannibal to MacArthur. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 187-208; Schram, S. R. (1989). 
The thought of Mao Tse-Tung. New York: Cambridge University Press, particularly page 60; 
Wright, D. C. (2001). The history of China. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, particularly pages 135-138. 
 
20 Mao, Z. (May 30, 1947). The Chiang Kai-shek government is besieged by the whole people. 
Hsinhua News Agency (China). Retrieved on May 5, 2009, from 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_20.htm. 
21 Ibid. Note also that Mao was to hold other titles during his tenure, including chairman of the 
Ninth Communist Party Congress and supreme commander of the nation and army (The 
Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2008). His ultimate successor, Deng Xiaoping, held only 
one: Chairman of the Central Military Commission (Fairbank & Goldman1998). 
22  Meredith, R. (2007). The elephant and the dragon: The rise of India and China and what it means 
to all of us. New York: W. W. Norton, p.18. 
23  Kurlantzick, J. (2007). Charm Offensive. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, p.12. 
24  Ibid., p.13. 
25  Cf. Beeson, M. (2007), op. cit., p. 174-175; Fairbank, J. K. and M. Goldman (1998); M. 
(Kurlantzick, J. (2007), op. cit. p 13; Jiang, Shixue (2008) in Roett, R. and G. Paz, Eds. (2008); 
Meredith, R. (2007), op. cit., p. 17. 
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Tectonic Semantic Shift in Socialism: Deng Xiaoping Lets the Cat Out of the Bag  
In 1977, following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) was rehabilitated for 
the third time; in 1978, he was the acknowledged leader of China and held sway over the 
direction of China’s political and economic direction through 1994. Deng’s professional 
development, talents and contributions to China’s accelerated socio-economic and political 
development are complex and beyond the scope of this paper. However, a brief profile will 
help to situate Deng in the drama of socio-political and economic continuity and change 
that has characterized China since the early part of the 20th century and will continue for the 
foreseeable future. Deng was a long-time figure in the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
leadership, having been initiated into communism during his stay in Paris (1920-1926), 
receiving further education in Moscow, and returning to China to work within the 
Communist Party, where he served as chief secretary of the Central Committee by 1927. He 
was mentored very early on by Zhou Enlai, and maintained a strong bond with him until 
Zhou’s death in January 1976. Deng became an ally of Mao and formed part of the 6000-
mile “Long March” (1934-1935) that helped to solidify the communist power base across 
China. In the war against Japan (1937-1945), Deng proved to be an excellent military leader 
and administrator—attributes that would serve him well in modernizing China more than 
three decades later.   
During the Cultural Revolution, Deng was “dismissed and purged” by Mao, then 
rehabilitated in 1972, at which point he served as Vice-Premier.26 Beginning in 1973, Deng 
and Premier Zhou Enlai successfully introduced the notion of comprehensive 
modernization, which, in January 1975, was expressed more specifically as the “four 
modernizations”—a 25-year plan for national industrialization through concurrent 
development of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense—which 
were complemented by policies of foreign trade, heightened academic standards, and re-
inviting “scientists and experts” into the institutional fold.27 This set of connected, 
purposeful elements targeting accelerated economic development was officially adopted in 
December 1978 and “became the framework for the post-Mao period;” state- centralized 
control at the macro-economic level was combined with local decision-making regarding 
areas of investment based on perceived returns (profit), complemented by Special 
Economic Zones to encourage “foreign investment and market liberalization,” leading to 
“an emphasis on light industry and export-led growth.”28 By allowing farmers to till their 
designated (state-owned) land—thus ending the practice of collectives—and to sell 
                                                 
26  Yergin, D. and Stanislaw, J. (1998). Commanding Heights. Retrieved on May 7, 2009, from 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/prof_dengxiaoping.html.  
27  Oden, R. K. (2003). The Deng Xiaoping Era: Assessing its impact on educational and cultural 
exchanges. Retrieved on May 7, 2009, from http://w3.pku.edu.cn/academic/dxp/pdf/ljk.pdf. 
28  Ibid. 
10
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whatever surplus they produced for profit, Deng immediately and substantially raised rural 
income  levels and initiated “small-scale” industry.29 
Deng’s set of seemingly contradictory practices—from either a socialist or capitalist 
perspective—were referred to as “socialism with Chinese characteristics;” that is, for some 
analysts, “land reform, vigorous regional markets, a lively service sector, and local 
government guidance of local enterprises,”30 and for others, “an attempt on a monumental 
scale to blend…state ownership and private property, central planning and competitive 
markets, political dictatorship and limited economic and cultural freedom.”31 Deng, 
universally characterized as a pragmatist, responded to these and similar appeals for 
clarification with the now ubiquitous aphorism: “It does not matter if a cat is black or white 
as long as it catches mice.” 32 The CCP’s relaxation of national economic policies in 1978 
unleashed a productivity-creativity force unparalleled in recent human history. Within two 
decades, as Goldman (1998) summarizes:33  
China was transformed from an isolated, poor, rural, and politically turbulent 
country into a relatively open, stable, urbanizing, and modernizing country. With an 
economy growing at 9 percent a year in the last two decades…China became the 
fastest-growing economy in the world.…In just twenty years, China had evolved 
from a nation in which roughly six out of ten people lived below the international 
poverty rate of one dollar a day into a nation in which per capita income virtually 
quadrupled. It had taken the United States nearly fifty years to double its per capita 
income in the nineteenth century; it had taken China just a decade. 
                                                 
29     Green, S., Shirk, S., and Zhang, Bin (April 30, 2009). The Stimulus China Needs: Reform the 




30  Fairbank, J. K. and Goldman, M. (1998). China, A new history. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press. 
31  Church, G. J. (January 6, 1986). China. Time. Retrieved on May 6, 2009, from 
         http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1074879,00.html.  
 
32
  Khanna, T. (2007). Billions of entrepreneurs: How China and India are reshaping their futures and 
yours. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, p. 41. See also,  Mahbubani, Kishore (17 
September 2008). Why Asia is Rising Now. Speech given at Eminent Speaker’s Forum. Retrieved on 
May 7, 2009, from http://www.adb.org/Knowledge-Management/documents/prof-mahbubani-
speech.pdf.   
 
33      Goldman, M. (1998). The post-Mao reform era. In China, A new history (enlarged edition). 
Fairbank, J. K. and M. Goldman. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
p. 406. 
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By the quarter-century mark of 2003, companies outside of China had invested more than 
$700 billion in China, and had built “hundreds of thousands of factories nationwide and 
hired tens of millions of people,” who were now earning fives times what they had been 
prior to the 1978 reform period, and purchasing “cell phones, computers, and even cars and 
apartments.”34 With respect to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)—which, along with 
perceived economic benefits, is also an indicator of perceived national stability and 
confidence by foreign investors—China, in 2004, surpassed the United States as the 
“world’s leading destination.”35 From 2002 to 2008, the increase of 185 million people to 
the Chinese middle class is equivalent to the “entire middle class increase for India (61M), 
Russia (37M), the U.S. (31M) and all of Europe – combined!” and, by the year 2016, the 
estimated amount of people in the Chinese middle class (by then, 334M), according to this 
same source of prediction, will have surpassed the total estimated population of the United 
States (by then, 314M).36 The recent global economic downturn also affected China, 
diminishing the growth of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 6.1 percent in the first 
quarter of 2009 for the first time in ten years; however, based largely on the Chinese 
government’s stimulus injection of $586 billion, China’s projected GDP growth this year is 
predicted to reach the 8 percent target.37 
Thus, to apply a single phrase to characterize Deng’s transformative role in China’s 
unforeseen and phenomenal economic and political growth, it would be the following: 
Deng, through his pragmatic, visionary, change-agent leadership, instituted policies and 
practices that had immediate and lasting results and consequences which influenced the 
Chinese national context and global economic and environmental contexts alike. The 
difference between Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping is apparent in the qualifier pragmatic, 
                                                 
34      Meredith, R. (2008). The elephant and the dragon: The rise of India and China and what it means     
for all of us. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, p. 10. 
35     Devlin, R., Estevadeordal, A., and Rodríguez-Clare, A., Eds. (2006). The emergence of China: 
Opportunities and challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington, D.C.: Inter-
American Development Bank, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard 
University, p. xxv. 
36     Adler, R. (November/December 2008). Counting on the middle class. In Miller-McClune, 
Turning research into solutions, pp. 20-23. 
37     Roberts, D. (May 18, 2009). China’s stimulus goes to work. Business Week, pp. 24-25. In this 
regard, Kishore Mahbubani (Spring 2009), in his article Can America fail?, published in The 
Wilson Quarterly (pp. 48-54), remarks on the limitations inherent in behaviors stemming from 
a continued belief in American exceptionalism: “America’s myopia is astounding and 
incomprehensible. When the stimulus packages of the Chinese and U.S. governments emerged 
at about the same time, I scanned American publications in search of attempts to compare the 
two measures. I could not find any. This confirmed my suspicion that American intellectuals 
and policy-makers could not even conceive of the possibility that the Chinese effort may be 
smarter or better designed than the American one” (p.52). 
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as both men were extraordinary leaders, visionaries and change agents—notwithstanding 
each having instituted various policies and practices that were seriously flawed and resulted 




Bi-Lateral Rifts and Shifts: The Semantics of China and U.S Policy 
Dynamics 
China, as is evident from the Century of Shame, did not exist in a vacuum during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Visits and encroachment by Western institutions and 
countries to China had been a phenomenon from the late thirteenth century and prevailed to 
differing degrees until the end of the Second World War. How the United States related to 
the internal challenges and changes in Chinese political orientations relate as well to later 
roles that each took within international arenas in which the two governments were present. 
The Korean War and Vietnam War (known as the American War in Vietnam and China) 
were two such arenas of bellicose conflict. Latin America is today another, albeit of 
geopolitical competition through peaceful, commercial and diplomatic means. Thus, an 
overview of each one’s historical policy toward the other is helpful in understanding current 
events and perspectives involving the two countries within Latin America (discussed in the 
final section).  
The United States’ policy toward China in 1941 supported Free China, that is, the 
Nationalist- (Guomindang) controlled area of China, which co-existed with the Japanese-
occupied area.38 The Nationalist were originally led by revolutionary republican Sun Yatsen 
(1866-1925) during the first quarter of the twentieth century and by Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang 
Jieshi) from 1927 to 1949—who, as head of the Free China government headquarters in 
Nanjing, was seen by the United States “as a representative of American ideals.”39 Thus, in 
fall 1945, the United States “intervened from the beginning [of the Chinese civil war] on the 
anti-communist side” and supplied the Nationalists even as it officially supported a 
coalition government comprised of the Communist Party of China and the Nationalist 
Party.40  
In spite of U.S. support, Chiang’s ineffective leadership and militaristic mind led to 
burdensome taxation, civilian punishments, hyperinflation, and misdirection of resources to 
                                                 
38 Fairbank and Goldman (1998), op. cit., p. 312 
39 Ibid, p. 327. 
40 Ibid, pp. 329, 330. 
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justify an unpopular civil war—actions which resulted in the disaffection of the general 
populace, including the wealthy, and ultimately enabled the CPC, with its superior 
strategies, to triumphantly enter Beijing in January 1949 with Mao Zedong’s troops “riding 
in American trucks led by American-made tanks.”41 On October 1, 1949, the People’s 
Republic of China was proclaimed, Mao Zedong became President of the Chinese 
Communist Party/Head of State/Chairman of the Central Committee Military Commission, 
Zhou Enlai became Prime Minister, and Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan.42 
During the Cold War (roughly, 1949-1989), China continuously supported Latin American 
countries in their struggles against both U.S. imperialism43 and the perceived danger of a 
third world war caused by the “competition for hegemony”44 between the United States and 
Soviet Union that, by 1950, was explicitly articulated.45 In the 1950s, the United States 
“made direct nuclear threats against [China] over Taiwan….more subtle threats over Korea 
and even Vietnam”46—following, in the latter case, the rhetoric-laden policy model of 
“preventing the Sino-Soviet communist monolith from conquering first Asia and then the 
world [even though] from the late 1950s on, U.S. intelligence had firm evidence that no 
such monolith existed,” and that, in fact, there had been a “highly exploitable Sino-Soviet 
split.” 47 China’s geopolitical vision for revolution and national liberation movements 
remained thwarted from the 1950s through the 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
                                                 
41 Ibid., pp. 331-334, 336. 
42 Li, Zhensheng (2003). Red-color news soldier: A Chinese photographer’s odyssey through the 
Cultural Revolution. London: Phaidon Press Limited, p. 312. 
43 See, for example, Grow, M. (2008). U.S. presidents and Latin American interventions: Pursuing 
regime change in the Cold War. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. Grow describes the 
continuity of the interventionist policy among U.S. presidents: “All told, six of the nine U.S. 
presidents who occupied the White House during the Cold War carried out at least one major 
intervention against a perceived enemy in the Western Hemisphere during their terms in office” (p. 
x). All were justified as deterring socialism, save that of President George H. W. Bush’s invasion of 
Panama, which was a ‘war on drugs’” (pp. x-xi). According to Grow’s analysis, the factors of “U.S. 
international credibility, U.S. domestic politics, and lobbying by Latin American and Caribbean 
actors”—the latter phenomenon described by Geir Lundestad as “’intervention by invitation’” (p. 
xiii)—superseded economic and security factors (p. xi). 
44 Jiang, Shixue (2008), op. cit., p. 29. 
45 McSherry, J. P. (2006). Op cit., p. 197. Specifically, McSherry cites and quotes from the National 
Security Council Paper No. 68. 
46 Bush, R. C. and O’Hanlon, M. E. (2007), op. cit., p. 154. 
47 Gelb, L. H. (May/June 2009). Necessity, choice, and common sense: A policy for a bewildering 
world, Foreign Affairs, pp. 56-72. Quote from p. 63.  
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development vision took precedence, but was delayed until the 1990s due to Latin 
America’s economic downturn during the decade of the 1980s.48 
Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on pragmatic economic development and opening China to 
foreign investment “subordinated the revolutionary and anti-imperialist elements of China’s 
foreign policy,” while the U.S. and other Western “policymakers concerns…were largely 
restricted to [China’s] nuclear proliferation and arms sales.”49 The effects of Mao Zedong’s 
closure of China and internal policies have been noted earlier, as have the effects of China’s 
opening and pragmatic approach to its economic development and policy of non-
intervention beginning with Deng Xiaoping in 1978.  
From the late 1990s to 2006, China’s competitive need for resources had taken it to 
countries inside and outside the political comfort zone of the United States, including 
Darfur, Iran, Myanmar (Burma), North Korea, Uzbek, and Zimbabwe.50 China has 
rethought this strategy in favor of more actively negotiating and participating with the 
United States and the United Nations toward limiting regimes’ actions that transgressed 
human rights or posed international security threats—although at times vacillating, as it did 
in the case of Myanmar, or continuing its relationship with countries labeled as 
“troublesome.”51 
Importantly, as early as 1949, but formalized in December 1953 in Premier Zhou En-Lai’s 
negotiations with India, and extended as a policy vis-à-vis all socialist countries, China had 
developed, advocated and practiced its Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence policy. 
The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China states:52 
The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence are diametrically opposed to power 
politics which have been in dominance in international relations over the last few 
centuries. The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence have become the basic 
norms in developing state to state relations transcending social systems and 
                                                 
48 Xiang, Lanxin (2008). An alternative Chinese view, in Roett, R. and G. Paz (Eds.), China’s expansion 
into the Western Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United States. Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Specific information on pp. 46-48. 
49 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, S. and Small, A. (January/February 2008). China’s new dictatorship diplomacy. 
Foreign Affairs, pp. 38-56. 
50 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, S. and Small, A. (January/February 2008). Op. cit., pp. 41-43. 
51 Ibid, pp. 43-51. 
52 Author, China’s initiation of the five principles of peaceful co-existence, Ministry of Foreign 
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ideologies. These principles have been accepted by the overwhelming majority of 
countries in the world. 
The five principles are:53 
mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty (changed to 
mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity at the Asian-
African Conference [1955]), mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, … and peaceful co-existence. 
Currently, amidst the continued bilateral cooperation there is also continued tension that 
demands to be constantly examined, confronted, interpreted and negotiated between the two 
countries, particularly as China’s projected political and economic ascendency continues as 
the United States experiences dramatic internal economic and institutional instability and 
downturns. Some analysts, for example, now cite aggregate Western figures to compensate 
for the lackluster performance of country-specific figures from the United States and 
compare China’s performance and political strength to that framework rather than to a bi-
lateral one.54 What to call this economic-political phenomenon also presents analysts with a 
quandary: Is it scientific socialism, capitalism, or some blend of each? If so, is it tending to 
move more in one direction that the other; that is, is it leading toward capitalism or 
socialism? Or, is it its own new paradigm? The economic ascendency model that China has 
developed is sometimes referred to, perhaps more by non-socialists, as state capitalism, “a 
system in which the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets 
primarily for political gain.”55 The final section addresses this question within the context of 
China’s presence in Latin America.  
 
 
Section IV  
China’s Scientific Socialism in Latin America: Whither U.S. Capitalism 
and Hegemony? 
As noted earlier, China’s economic development embraced foreign investment and export-
driven growth. As China continued its widespread accelerated growth, so, too, did the need 
for material resources and markets soar. The aggressive strategy of developing markets and 
the relentless need to seek resources within and outside of China have been 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 See, for example: Ikenberry, G. John (January/February 2008). The rise of China and the future of 
the West: Can the Liberal system survive? Foreign Affairs. 
55 Bremmer, I. (May/June 2009). State capitalism comes of age. Foreign Affairs, p. 41. 
16




CHINESE SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE:  
GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
PAGE 20  2009   JOURNAL OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS  ●   WWW.ICAINSTITUTE.ORG 
 
complemented—or, alternately, confounded—by cooperative agreements with nations 
inside and outside the fold of socialism and heightened security concerns by the United 
States—the latter area of study having adherents on opposite sides of the issue who are 
referred to pejoratively as “panda sluggers” and “panda huggers.” 56 China’s forays into 
East Asian and African spheres are an example of this developing complex global presence. 
Worldwide attention—whether political, economic, social or cultural—continues to be 
increasingly focused on China. However, China’s relatively recent presence in Latin 
America, as investor, partner and purchaser, raises high the flag of hegemonic concern, as 
this particular region has been closely tied—militarily, politically and economically—to the 
United States since the Monroe Doctrine was announced in 1823, and is considered, 
however belittling to Latin America and self-serving of the United States, as its “back 
yard.”57  
This final section addresses China’s presence in Latin America, using as its base the points 
of view of two Chinese scholars, published in 2008—the one, offering a no-threat-to-U.S.-
hegemony scholarly perspective; the other, presenting a scenario of caution due to possible 
geopolitical shifts. Analyses by other writers, from China and Latin America, will 
complement and inform these two viewpoints. The analysis and interpretation of the two 
perspectives should result in a particularly cultural and timely understanding of current 
Chinese geopolitical policies toward Latin America, and the degree to which they are 
embraced or repudiated by private and government sectors within the United States.  
Semantics and Soft Power: China’s Latin America and Caribbean Policy  
On November of 2008, China View (which, according to its self-reported description, is “an 
online news service of Xinhua News Agency…garnering 800 million hits and 80 million 
page views per day… [a] the top news website in China, and one of the most influential 
sites in the world”) reported that it had printed the full text of the Chinese government’s 
“first ever” policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (CPPLAC).58 The wording, 
tone and intent of the policy—shared and discussed with Latin American leaders prior to its 
                                                 
56 Bush, R. C. and O’Hanlon, M. E. (2007). A war like no other: The truth about China’s Challenge to 
America. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
57 See, for example, Roett, R. and Paz, G. (2008). Introduction: Assessing the implications of China’s 
growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, in Roett, R. and Paz, G. (Editors), China’s expansion 
into the Western Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United States. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, p.1; Jiang, Shixue (2008). The Chinese Foreign policy perspective, in   
Schoultz, L. (1998). Beneath the United States: A history of U.S. policy toward Latin America. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
58 Author (November 5, 2008). China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. China 
View. Retrieved on March 27, 2009, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
11/05/content_10308117.htm. the specific date report was made available on China View as a full 
text rather than as a link.  
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finalization—could not be more different from the historical unilateral, interventionist, 
ethnocentric, racialist and paternalistic approach of the United States, explicitly articulated 
in the Monroe Doctrine (1823), the notion of Manifest Destiny,59 and American 
exceptionalism.60  
The use of rhetoric that assumes and promotes unity among equals and shared interests—
regardless of political suasion—therefore, tends to draw in rather than repel, and remains 
wholly consistent with the Five Principles of Co-Existence policy described earlier. 
Tellingly, the CPPLAC policy document repeats the terms peace/peaceful and development 
six times each in its succinctly stated 230-word Foreword, and directly conveys related 
terms that reinforce the spirit and intent of working toward common goals in unity, all of 
which are captured in the Foreword’s key sentence: “It is in the fundamental interest of 
people in all countries and also their common aspiration to share development 
opportunities, jointly address challenges and promote the noble cause of peace and 
development of mankind.”61   
 
 
                                                 
59 See, for example, Cleary, M. R. (2008). Explaining the Left’s Resurgence, in L. Diamond, M. F. 
Plattner, and D. Abente Brun, (Eds.), Latin America’s struggle for democracy. Baltimore, MD: The 
John Hopkins University Press, pp. 70-71; Crandall, R. C. (2007). The United States and Latin 
America after the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. xii; Nugent, W. (2008). Habits 
of empire: A histrocy of American expansion. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 216ff, 234ff; O’Brien, T. 
F. (2007). Making the Americas: The United States and Latin America from the age of revolution to 
the era of globalization. Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, pp. 18-49; 
Scholultz, L. (1998). Beneath the United States: A history of U.S. policy toward Latin America. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. xiv-xv. 
60 Senator Albert Beveridge’s statement, recorded in the Congressional Record on January 9, 1900, 
embodied, according to Lars Schoultz (1998, op. cit., p. 90), his generation’s notion of American 
exceptionalism: 
“God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for 
nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. No! He has made us the master 
organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns. He has given us the spirit of 
progress to overwhelm the forces of reaction throughout the earth. He has made us adept in 
government that we may administer government among savage and senile people. Were it not for 
such a force as this the world would relapse into barbarism and night. And of all our race He has 
marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world. 
This is the divine mission of America, and it holds for us all the profit, all the glory, all the happiness 
possible to man. We are the trustees of the world’s progress, guardians of the righteous peace.” 
 
61 Author (November 5, 2008), op. cit. 
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The specific areas of development include:62  
1. Political Field (e.g., non-interference; “make the international political and 
economic order more fair and equitable”);  
2. Economic Field (e.g., “expand and balance two-way trade;” “achieve common 
development;” “properly settle trade frictions through consultation and 
cooperation;” “free trade agreements;” reciprocal investment; promote “Chinese 
commercial banks to set up branches;” “Cooperation in flora and fauna inspection 
will be intensified and agricultural trade will be expanded to jointly uphold food 
security;” industrial cooperation; China “will strengthen practical cooperation … in 
transport, information and communications, water conservancy and hydropower and 
other areas of infrastructure development;” China “wishes to expand and deepen 
mutually beneficial cooperation … in resources and energy within bilateral 
cooperation frameworks;” customs, quality inspection, and tourism cooperation; 
support of debt reduction and cancellation; economic and technical assistance; 
promote “South-South cooperation, bringing about a more just and equitable 
multilateral trading regime and ensuring a bigger say and greater role in decision-
making;” “deepen its cooperation with chambers of commerce of Latin America 
and the Caribbean”); 
3. Cultural and Social Aspects (e.g., cultural and sports exchanges; cooperation in 
science, technology and education, including “aeronautics and astronautics, bio-
fuel, resources and environment technology, marine technology,” among others; 
“wider application of Chinese technologies on energy-conservation, digital medical 
treatment, small hydropower and other results of scientific research and advanced 
applied techniques;” provision of “technical training, services and demonstration;” 
“mutual recognition of diplomas and academic degrees, and increase the number of 
Chinese government scholarships;” “vigorously promote exchanges and cooperation 
in the medical and health care sector … and share experiences … in such areas as 
disease control, response to  public health emergencies, and control of HIV/AIDS 
and bird flu;” “help improve local medical facilities and train local medical 
professionals;” consular cooperation and personnel exchanges; media cooperation; 
people-to-people exchanges; cooperation in environmental protection, combating 
climate change, human resources and social security, disaster reduction/relief and 
humanitarian assistance, and poverty alleviation); 
4. On Peace, Security and Judicial Affairs (e.g., “will actively carry out military 
exchanges and defense dialogue and cooperation….mutual visits by defense and 
military officials….provide assistance for the development of the army in Latin 
                                                 
62 Author (November 5, 2008), op. cit. 
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American and Caribbean countries;”63 cooperation in judicial and police affairs, 
including sharing “information on illegal immigration and improve the capacity for 
its prevention;” “combating terrorism [and other] non-traditional security threats.” 
Language as a Globally Relevant Cohesive Force: Semantic Convergence?  
The Chinese government’s foreign policy language—formally initiated in December 1953 
and present in the current CCPLAC policy document—continues to provide the foundation 
for the cohesive “glue”64 that bonds peoples and states in terms of, if not identity, at least in 
the form of identification, of being kindred spirits, clearly and locally present in substantive 
aspects of the global enterprise within which all are engaged. The bonding process has been 
in place and in action for some 56 years, and its properties appear to be drawing more 
adherents. This spirit of unity and common purpose, destiny, and interests have been absent 
from the United States’ centuries of geopolitical and commercial strategies and presence in 
Latin America—where, conversely, the spirit and action of “coercion and military force” 
have prevailed65 and the overall policy profile of the United States has been described as 
that of a “bad neighbor”66 manifesting a two-centuries-long ingrained prejudice toward 
Latin America67 that has extended into the post-Cold War “new world order” era.68 
                                                 
63 Currently, China is interested in trade, including the sale of weapons, rather than, say, building up 
its or others’ military as a potential threat to the United States (personal communication, Colonel 
Eric Rojo, USA Ret., May 11, 2009). The weapons trade may be subsumed under military assistance, 
as McSherry (2006, p. 202) reminds us: “Under Clinton, U.S. military assistance, as well as 
equipment and training for Latin America [sic] more than tripled from FY 1996 to 1997. In 1997, 
the Administration lifted its ban on sales of advanced weaponry and heavy arms to Latin America, 
in a clear case of complementary military and economic interests.” There are more extreme, 
although highly improbable, scenarios relative to the possibility of armed conflict; see, for example, 
Bush, R. C. and O’Hanlon, M. E. (2007). A war like no other: The truth about China’s Challenge to 
America. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. The probability of such scenarios is dampened by the fact 
of U.S. military expenditures and global presence. In 2008, for example, the military expenditures of 
the United States accounted for 41.5% of the world’s total military expenditure of $1.464 trillion 
(2005 constant dollars); China, number two in military expenditures “for the first time” in 2008, 
accounts for 5.8% of the world’s share (Anup Shah [2009, September 9], World Military Spending, 
Global Issues; retrieved October 24, 2009, at http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-
military-spending).  
64 Chua, A. (2007). Day of empire: How hyperpowers rise to global dominance—and why they fall. 
New York: Doubleday. 
65 Ibid, pp. 326-344. 
66 Pastor, R. A. (July/August 2008). The future of North America: Replacing a bad neighbor policy. 
Foreign Affairs, 87(4), p. 85. 
67 Schoultz, L. (1998). Op. cit., pp. 378-379. 
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The differential policy approaches extend beyond the merely contrastive or historical. As 
indicated above, the Chinese policy approach is about creating bonds among communities 
such that they begin to identify themselves as sharing common values and characteristics 
with China in order to work together, particularly within a common space—that may 
indeed be the country itself. The notion of soft power was introduced by Joseph Nye in 
1990 in an article he published in Foreign Policy; in 2004, Nye (cited in Kurlantzick, 2007) 
stated that soft power “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.… It is leading 
by example and attracting others to do what you want.”69 Kurlantzick (2007) posits that 
the:70   
Chinese government and many nations influenced by China enunciate a broader 
idea of soft power… [as it can now mean] anything outside of the military and 
security realm, including…popular culture and public diplomacy… [and] more 
coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation 
in multilateral organizations.…China can now wield this kind of soft power, and 
may use it to remake the world.…China’s new benign image…will help Beijing 
execute its foreign policy more successfully. 
The multifaceted question is what can be expected from China’s diverse forays into Latin 
America, whether through soft power or hard power, particularly insofar as relates to the 
goals of scientific socialism (or alternate terms Western analysts apply), and what 
implications might result relative to the traditional hegemony exercised by the United States 
in this region? 
China’s Presence in Latin America:  
Hegemonic Shift or Hegemonic Neutral? 
 The first of two Chinese specialists mentioned earlier, Jiang Shixue,71 in his 2008 
publication acknowledges that Latin America, as a region, has been “traditionally perceived 
as the backyard of the United States” and states emphatically that “in no way should 
China’s growing presence be interpreted as a challenge to U.S. hegemony in the 
hemisphere.”72 Yet, identification among states operating to various degrees within the state 
                                                                                                                                               
68 McSherry, J. P. (2006). Preserving hegemony: National security doctrine in the post-Cold War era, 
in Kingstone, P. R. (2006), Readings in Latin American politics: Challenges to democratization. 
Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, pp. 194-205. 
69 Kurlantzick (2007), op. cit., p. 5. 
70 Kurlantzick (2007), op. cit., pp. 6-8. 
71 Chair of the Latin American Studies Department at the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences (CASS) and deputy director and professor, Institute of Latin American Studies 
(ILS), in Beijing, China. 
72 Jiang, Shixue (2008), op. cit., p. 28.  
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capitalism model—including Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela73—may draw them, and other 
Latin American and Caribbean countries, together, particularly as “these emerging-market 
countries only partially embraced free-market principles.”74 The preponderant metaphor and 
ideology of free-market capitalism is that of the “invisible hand;” that of scientific socialism 
and state capitalism may be termed the “guided hand,” where the state-private sector 
relationship operates in tandem, and, ideally, in efficient and productive synchrony. The 
U.S. historical “either-or” perspective remains evident toward protecting the free-market 
ideological model—as defined by the U.S.—against any variation; Bremmer’s (May/June 
2009), writing in Foreign Affairs, perpetrates this non-negotiable position:75  
The United States should reassert its commitment to expanding trade both with the 
European Union…and with growing economic powers…not least to ensure that 
these countries do not creep toward state capitalism, thereby adding to the 
inefficiencies in the global market and limiting U.S. commercial opportunities. 
Hedging his bets, however, Bremmer then recommends that the United States should accept 
sovereign wealth investments from state capitalism countries after a “careful review that 
they do not compromise U.S. national security.”76 Gelb (May/June 2009, p. 69), on the 
other hand, states that “If there is anything approaching an ideological battle in the world 
today, it is between what other states perceive as U.S. unilateralism and their own sense of 
entitlement.”77  
Jiang (2008) writes that China’s post-cold war view of the world’s trajectory consisted of 
four elements, including that “hegemonic tendencies would continue … in particular the 
United States,”78 that peace and development would be the modus operandi rather than war 
                                                 
73 Bremmer, I. (May/June 2009), op. cit., pp. 41-47. 
74 Ibid, p. 48. 
75 Ibid, p. 54. The irony of this quote is enhanced by recent and extensive state capitalism practices 
in the United States, which included saving the banking system, as well as its perennial role in 
funding the military industrial complex and its periodic practice of corporate socialism. See Ian 
Bremmer (2009, April 28), Q&A with Ian Bremmer on State Capitalism, Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/qa-with-ian-bremmer-on-state-capitalism.  
76 Ibid, p. 55. 
77 Gelb (May/June 2009), op. cit., p.69. 
78 Wood, E. M. (1981, pp. 169-189), in her article Liberal democracy and capitalist hegemony: A 
reply to Leo Panitch on the task of socialist political theory, published in The Socialist Register (vol. 
18), writes: “To say that liberal democracy is 'hegemonic' is to say both that it serves the particular 
interests of the capitalist class and that its claims to universality have an element of truth…. 
Capitalist hegemony, then, rests to a significant extent on a formal separation of 'political' and 
'economic' spheres which makes possible the maximum development of purely juridical and 
political freedom and equality without fundamentally endangering economic exploitation (pp. 181). 
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and revolution, the world order would be characterized as multi-polar, and that “China and 
other developing countries would seek to unite in the struggle against an unjust world order 
in which the rules of the game are determined by the developed nations.”79 The 
international sanctions brought about by the Tiananmen Square incident and the 
“uncertainty” of Soviet political viability led to Deng’s articulation and dissemination of the 
“guiding principle of twenty-four characters,” namely, as a nation, keep calm in the face of 
world events, firm in the face of pressure, and confident in the face of difficulties; “keep a 
low profile, never assume a leadership role, and take action.”80 This included “staying the 
socialist course in China while continuing to move forward with economic reform.”81 The 
Confucian principle of harmony was officially integrated into China’s socialist fabric in the 
2006 statement by the Chinese Communist Party (and later expanded to world harmony by 
President Hu on the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations):82 
Social harmony is the intrinsic nature of the socialism with Chinese characteristics 
and an important guarantee of the country’s prosperity, the nation’s rejuvenation, 
and the people’s happiness. 
China’s presence—and integration—into the fabric of Latin American political and 
economic life extends well beyond the selling and purchasing of goods. It includes having 
an antidote, through economic diversification, to the United States using its “economic 
leverage to exert political pressure on China,” partnering with Latin America to articulate 
South-South views on international issues, and establishing long-term and even permanent 
relationships with political and diplomatic entities, such as the Rio Group, Mercosur, 
Organization of American States, UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Latin American Integration Association, Inter-American Development Bank, 
and Latin American Parliament.83 The launching of two satellites jointly by China and 
Brazil highlighted the effects and potential of South-South cooperation in science and 
technology, but there are many other areas of cooperation, including “agriculture, forestry, 
fisheries, animal husbandry, medicine, earthquake prediction, manufacturing, information 
technology, biology, geology, and aerospace.”84 
                                                                                                                                               
Retrieved on May 27, 2009, from 
http://socialistregister.com/socialistregister.com/files/SR_1981_Woods.pdf.  
79 Jiang (2008), op. cit., p. 31. 
80 Ibid, p. 31. 
81 Ibid, p. 32. 
82 Ibid, pp. 33-34. 
83 Ibid, pp. 34-35. 
84 Ibid, p. 37. 
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Socialist ideology and practices are also at the Latin America’s policy-influencing discourse 
table through the Chinese Communist Party’s party-to-party relations with the Socialist 
International Committee for Latin America and the Caribbean, the São Paulo Forum, the 
Christian Democrat Organization of America, and the Permanent Conference of Latin 
American Political Parties, and, importantly, include “ties with more than twenty political 
parties in ten of the twelve countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan…in an 
effort to advance China’s diplomatic interests.”85 China’s relationship with countries of the 
Caribbean is characterized by diplomatic and development respect, attention, and high 
visibility, as well as economic trade86—factors that are uncharacteristic historically and 
currently of United States’ diplomatic profile. As stated earlier, the reaction of the United 
States through the voices of its specialists and politicians to China’s presence in Latin 
America and other parts of the globe is perhaps in too many cases competitive, distancing, 
self-serving, jingoistic and even hostile.87 This posturing is, in a phrase, archaic, arrogant 
and alarmist, and will certainly be judged by the global community—as has been the case 
since the Cold War—as unbecoming of a global leader in a multi-polar world and ill-suited 
to contributing substantively to its collective needs and vision. 
The second of the two specialists reviewed about China in Latin America is Xiang (2008), 
who acknowledges that the U.S. (Washington, D.C.) has a “growing suspicion that China 
has a well-thought-out design or grand strategy to undermine the traditional U.S. dominance 
in the region.” 88 Importantly, Xiang does not agree with this U.S. perspective. Historical 
and current phenomena that spark perceived kindred spirit affinities include China’s and 
Latin America’s colonial/semi-colonial past, their developing country status and challenges, 
                                                                                                                                               
 
85 Ibid, pp. 35-36. 
86 Ibid. pp. 36-37. 
87 See James, H. (January/February 2009). The making of a mess: Who broke global finance, and 
who should pay for it? Foreign Affairs, vol. 88 (1), pp. 162-168; also, Jiang (2008), op. cit., pp. 38-40. 
Yu (2008, op. cit., p. 43) writes: “in order to maintain its hegemonic position in world trade and 
production the United States always takes augmenting its military strength as the trump card. 
American military operations abroad have never ceased since the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
and the drastic change in Eastern Europe: the invasion of Panama in 1989; the Gulf War from 1990 
to 1991; the military intervention in Somali from 1992 to 1993; air raids over the Gulf area from 
1998 to 1999; air strikes against Kosovo and Yugoslavia in 1999; the war against Afghanistan in 
2001 and the war against Iraq in 2003. 
 
88 Xiang, Lanxin (2008), op. cit., p. 44. Xiang is a professor of international history and politics at the 
University of Geneva (Switzerland) and a former Henry Alfred Kissinger Scholar in Foreign 
Policy and International Relations at the U.S. Library of Congress. Xiang earned his doctorate 
from the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University in 
1990. Xiang received his B.A. from Fudan University in Shanghai. 
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the types of goods that China needs to import and Latin America has for export, and the 
prospect of sorely needed investment from China to Latin America.89 But Chinese policy is 
driven, according to Xiang (2008), not fundamentally by these qualities or by mere 
economic development, but by geopolitical factors, stemming from China’s lack of 
acceptance of the “Yalta Treaty’s post-war power reconfiguration” and discomfort with the 
“accompanying Bretton Woods system of a liberal international economic order dominated 
by the United States and embodied in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank.”90  
Latin America, according to Xiang (2008), became salient in the CPC during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, as two principles became evident that could well relate to China’s own 
issue of maintaining internal stability within the context of “social shock resulting from 
economic modernization:” First, “intrinsic social transformation that resulted from 
democratic electoral process should not be dismissed,” and second, the “Pinochet political 
model—an orderly transition of power from authoritarianism to democracy—[provided] a 
link between the internal politics of a Latin American country and the political future of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC).”91 The phenomenon of “energy politics,” and China’s 
subsequent development of “geopolitics research centers,” has also added fuel to the 
suspicions of the U.S. relative to China’s presence in Latin America since the late 1990s.92 
Xiang’s (2008) analysis-based perspective on China’s Latin American policy over the past 
three decades leads to a profile—admittedly one that is generated from outside of China—
of official China as well behind the curve, whether relative to learning, sensitivity, or 
solidarity, due to its official, long-term, operating penchant for interacting with party, 
political and organizational elites rather than also embracing those leaders, whether 
incipient or actual, representing populist sectors.93  
Currently, China is seeking to maintain its export volume to North America, and 
particularly the United States, and to invest in manufacturing within Latin America that will 
sustain its competitive advantage. However, investment in “trade and manufacturing sectors 
remain small: some 380 firms with $3 billion as of 2005, half of which is invested in 
Venezuela.”94 If the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) were to materialize, Xiang 
(2008) predicts that China would be hard pressed to compete with the 30-country grouping, 
                                                 
89 Xiang, Lanxin (2008), ibid, p. 45. 
90 Xiang, Lanxin (2008), ibid, p. 46 
91 Xiang, Lanxin (2008), ibid, p. 49. 
92 Xiang, Lanxin (2008), ibid, p. 50. 
93 Xiang, Lanxin (2008), ibid, p. 51. 
 
94 Xiang, Lanxin (2008), ibid, p. 53. 
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as costs and prices would be competitive, and trade routes and geographic distance an 
advantage to projected Latin American producers and suppliers.95 Nevertheless, for Xiang 
(2008), present and near-term economic expansion opportunities for China within the 
Western Hemisphere appear stronger than weaker. In the longer term, China appears to be 
pinning some of its hopes on the geopolitical shift that would result from the successful 
integration of Latin America as a unified bloc, along the lines of the Bolivarian Movement 
spearheaded by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, to “move away from the Monroe 
Doctrine concept [,] reduce the region’s dependence on the North American market [,]… 
[and have China] as an alternative market and partner.”96 This would also place China in a 
more favorable position for balancing its infrastructure development investments in energy 
and minerals reserves within Latin America with its subsequent extraction and sale to 
China, together with agricultural products.97 Xiang (2008) sees China’s relationship with 
Latin America as a “neocolonial pattern” and draws a telling, perhaps cautionary, analogy 
with Britain’s past colonial trade pattern in South America—essentially, economic 
monocultural- or near-monocultural-like export models—which, in China’s case, includes 
soybeans from Argentina, copper from Chile and Peru, and “five primary and agricultural 
products” from Brazil.98 
Conclusion 
The presence of China in Latin America (and globally) is a work in progress. Its incipient 
form, at this point, is perceived or analyzed in multiple ways, most of which result in trying 
to view with precision a new phenomenon by looking through lenses that need to be 
refined, if not replaced. For example, in the United States, traditional analyses tend to be 
reproduced through conservative, neo-conservative, moderate, liberal, or progressive 
lenses.99 Others might use regional lenses that reflect traditional political or economic 
                                                 
95 Xiang, Lanxin (2008), ibid, pp. 53-54. 
96 Xiang, Lanxin (2008), ibid., p. 54. 
97 Xiang, Lanxin (2008), ibid, p. 55. 
98 Xiang, Lanxin (2008), ibid, p. 55. 
99 See Deudney, D. and Ikenberry, G. J. (January/February 2009). The myth of the autocratic revival: 
Why liberal democracy will prevail. Foreign Affairs, vol. 88(1), pp. 77-93. The authors’ base their 
analysis on the lens through which they perceive China (and Russia), that is, one of authoritarian 
capitalism, rather than scientific socialism. Thus, they conclude that the policy of the United States 
(and other “liberal democracies”) should integrate “nondemocratic” states in international 
institutions based on the premise that autocratic capitalism will inevitably yield to liberal 
democratic capitalism. To opt for non-integration—exclusion—would “worsen relations and 
reinforce authoritarian rule” (p.93). The premise characterizes the notion of hegemonic liberalism 
(see footnote 76 above).  
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analyses emanating from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East—or one 
country’s or region’s analysis, whether comparative or contrastive, of a region outside its 
own. The analyses cum rhetoric of many U.S. political and economic analysts regarding 
China’s global, regional or national activities send the same, tired Cold War-type “us versus 
them” messages and reflect those same scenarios of potential threat and destruction.100 
More market-driven analysts might favor the reality of competitive trade, but are no more 
able to gauge the effects of China’s national development or expansionist needs and what 
effects they may have on the United States and other countries. Chinese analysts are able to 
situate China within historical and current contexts, from national to global, but differ 
regarding the implications of China’s current extraordinary geopolitical position or 
ambitions. Economic analyses—trade figures, comparative country figures, etc.—are 
interesting but do not lift the veil on the trend toward any particular political or economic 
shift or model. 
Scientific socialism, under the Communist Party of China’s leadership, particularly over the 
past thirty years, has produced its own prism, and is producing a dramatic spectrum of new 
waves and distributions, emanating colors beyond red. To objectively view, analyze and 
interpret these complex phenomena, analysts must first gain access to, and learn to 
appropriately use, lenses that transcend their particular ideology. Yu (2008, p. 47) situates 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” ideologically:101 
There are fundamental differences between socialism with Chinese characteristics 
and democratic socialism in whether or not upholding the guidance of Marxist 
theory, the communist objective, the dominant position of public ownership of the 
means of production or the democratic dictatorship of the people. Drawing a clear 
line of demarcation between the two means drawing a clear line of demarcation 
between Marxism-Leninism and anti-Marxism-Leninism and between socialism and 
capitalism. This is of great significance for us as we look at the downfall of the 
Party and the state in the former Soviet Union and maintain the leading position of 
Marxism in the ideological field. 
Missing, then, is an analytical perspective to capture potentially new forms emanating from 
the scientific socialist prism. A perspective or spate of perspectives that, first, may identify 
and scrutinize, however tentatively, the various dimensions associated with the neo-rhetoric 
and reach of globalization—that is, how Chinese scientific socialism has interacted with 
institutions and populations, as well as with unprecedented historical dynamics, within its 
national context and outside of its national borders to create a new prism and produce new 
waves. Secondly, an analytical perspective must capture the degree to which this unique 
phenomenon is economically-, socially- and politically-viable in producing globally 
beneficial strategies, actions and well-distributed outcomes.  
                                                 
100 James, H. (January/February 2009), op. cit., p. 163. 
101 Yu, Pei (2008), op. cit., p. 47. 
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The China-Latin America-United States triangle remains in the making and its future form 
uncertain. However, the fact that it is under construction is unquestioned. The variables that 
are in place are many and their weight unknown. Will there be a South American oil cartel, 
a Free Trade Area of the Americas, a new and improved U.S.-Mexico-Canada arrangement, 
an integrated South America, a distancing from or moving toward the U.S., a Latin 
American trend toward state capitalism? Will China’s party-to-party diplomacy lead to a 
spirit of camaraderie that the U.S. has never been able to develop, much less enjoy? All is 
speculation at this point, however well-based on facts and figures.  
China does appear to speak a language that communicates and resonates nationally and 
globally, in no small part due to its claim to having or to having a socially-grounded, 
egalitarian foundation, complemented by the presence or prospects of substantive Chinese 
external investment directed at relevant economic development that extends beyond its 
current political boundaries. On the other hand, the United States, however unjustifiably, is 
being profiled and measured as, alternately, an also-ran, a dark horse or a defending 
champion—but not as the clear winner or even top contender. China has taken pains over 
generations to establish itself as a nation, as a people, as a world player. It looked inward 
and produced a rhetoric that reflects principles of unity that, I argue,  in most cases can 
reflect those upon which democracies are founded. The defining difference between China 
and the United States is that, respectively, the group is the unit of analysis rather than the 
individual.102  
China now shares more amply its rhetoric and communicates internationally that for all to 
prosper it needs and seeks others with whom to share opportunities, markets, investments, 
development, and power. It is a rhetoric that fits the times. And the practices that relate to it 
have to this point resulted in gains that are at once spectacular, widespread and, particularly 
given the present economic climate, unique in productivity, however environmentally 
degradative. To what degree this rhetoric and practice also reflects the philosophy of 
scientific socialism or a substantive trend toward the application of what is termed scientific 
socialism within China or beyond its borders remains unclear.103 What is clear is that, 
                                                 
102  Wood, E. M. (1981, op. cit., p. 187) differentiates between liberalism and democracy, stating that 
the former alienates power “in order to permit fundamentally individualistic human beings to 
occupy themselves with private concerns.” 
103 Lanxin Xiang’s (2006, Sunday, April 16; p. B03) quote illustrates this state of ambiguity (Why 
Washington Can’t Speak Chinese. The Washington Post). Retrieved on June 4, 2009, at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/04/14/AR2006041401896.html?sub=AR:  
As China’s economic strength grows, no one, not even the Chinese ourselves, can prevent 
China’s influence from spreading into politics, values and ideology. It is in those arenas that 
conflicts with the United States can arise, and unfortunately, it is precisely in those areas that 
misunderstandings between the two nations run rampant…. Washington’s policy elites hardly 
deserve all the blame for the lack of mutual understanding. For a long time, Chinese leaders 
have been incapable of explaining China to the outside world. When the Chinese invent a 
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whatever its name, over the past thirty years and for the foreseeable future, it is working 
better than the traditional capitalist rhetoric and practice.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
foreign policy theme, they often deploy coded language that leads to more confusion than 
clarity on the international front. 
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